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1. Introduction
In Arrow-Deb rew formulation of general equilibrium under uncertainty,
two rather unrealistic assumptions are made. First, they assume that all
uncertainties are of the exogeneous nature and are objective, while, more
important uncertainties may be endogeneous ones. Second, partially as
a result of the first assumption, they assumed that there are complete
markets for each contingency.
When we relax the second assumptions because of transaction costs,
incomplete information, moral hazard or some other reasons, we obtain in-
complete market structure. It is one of the important results in incomplete
market theory that efficiency of equilibria depends upon underlying market
structure, especially upon availability of different financial securities.
For example, Diamond [1] showed that, in a restricted economy, with incomplete
markets and stock markets, an equilibrium with firm's value maximization
behavior will achieve "constrained" efficiency. Hamely, an equilibrium is
Pareto efficient among all the possible allocations which are feasible
with stock markets. Since, in general, such an equilibrium is not "full"
Pareto efficient, there is a good reason to expect other types of financial
institutions should emerge.
In this paper, we would like to analyze the property of an economy
with a banking sector, which provides a riskless asset by pooling individual
risks inherent to each individual firm. Following Modigliani-Jaf fee [4],
we assume that banks provide loans to a firm whose return is contingent
upon the solvency of the firi&.
In order to avoid possiblities of inefficiency caused by reasons
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other than the existence of banking sector (e.g., see Hart [3]), we assume
the same technology as in Diamond. Our main interest lies in the question
if our economy will achieve constrained efficiency. Because of the well-
known problem of value .maximization criterion due to the possibility of
bankruptcy, we shall focus upon the stockholder's (investor's) preference
on firm's action.
Many works on stockmarkets assume the existence of a riskless
asset. However, unless we analyze the mechanism of a financial interme-
diary which provides such an asset, the conclusion may be misleading. In
fact, we shall shot/ in this paper that even in Diamond economy with bank
(and therefore a certain rule of bankruptcy and a certain rule of limited
liability), a constrained Farato efficient allocation is unstable in the sense
that all the stockholders may want firms to change their actions, leading
to Inefficient state of the economy.
In section 2, we -•rill present the model. In section 3, we will show
that for each choice of firm's action, there is a corresponding price
and allocation. In section 4, our main result will be presented. Section 5
concludes the paper. A mathematical proof is relegated to appendix.
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2. Model
The economy consists of three different types of agents; con-
sumers, firms, and banks. There is only one good and there are two periods;
period and 1. In period 0, consumer can invest either in firms which. will
yield a risky return in period 1 but with limited' liability or in bank
deposit which will yield a safe return (with possibly, positive interest
rate) . Firms invest a certain amount of good in period which can be
financed either directly by consumers or by banks in the form of bank loans.
We assume that firms have individual risks (Malinvand [5]). That is,
given a certain amount of investment, a firm may find itself in period
1 in one of several possible states with respect to output. The probability
of the occurrence of a state for a firm is independent of the probability for
any other firm. Given the amount of investment and loan in period 0, if a
firm is in a state such that its output fails short of its obligation to banks,
it goes bankrupt and all the output will be confiscated by creditors (banks).
On the other hand, if a firm finds itself in a state where it can meet its
loan obligation, the firm will distribute the difference between the output
and the loan as dividends to investors proportionally to the amount of invest-
ment. Finally banks provide safe asset (deposit) to consumers and provides
loan to firms. Bank? can pool the risk inherent to loans, for we arsume that
there are an infinite number of identical firms of each type with independent
but identical individual risks. By the law of large numbers, the proportion
of a certain type of firms in a certain state is equal to the objective
probability of the state to occur.
Formally, there are m types of consumers indexed by i = l,...,m,
and n firms indexed by j = i,...,n. There are infinitely many consumers and
firms of each type. Let (i, k) denote the k-th consumer of i-th type and
(;j , k) denote the k-th consumer of type j. Define E to be a set of

consumers (i, k) for all i and firms ( j , k) for all j. We assume;
(A.l) For all i and k , a consumer (I, k) can invest only in firms in E
Without such an assumption, a consumer can invest in infinitely
many firms and completely po >3 the risk. In the reality, a consumer can-
invest only in a finite number of firms because of indivisibility of stocks and
transaction coses. In this sense, our formulation may be considered as an
approximation of the reality. For the firms in which a consumer invests
should be determined endogeneously rather than exogeneously as in our formulation.
Let us start with a firm (j, k) . For the sake of simplicity, we
drop k from subscripts. Let e ;' R, be the units of good invested in j-th
firm by i-th consumer (in E, ) in period and let I « R be the units of
*
.1 +
loan j-th firm borrows from banks. A unit of loan is a contract such that the
firm will pay one unit of good in period 1 if it does not go bankrupt and will
surrender all the outputs to banks if it goes bankrupt. Let p. |R be the
j +
price (in terms of good in period 0) of a unit of loan to a firm of type j.
1/p. - 1 is the rate of interest on loan tor firm of type j.
Let S. be the set of all Individual states for j-th firm which
is a finite set. Let a. i R for all s.r S. be the output-input ratio
.is
:
+ 3 3
for i-th firm if state s. occurs. We assume a. is constant and therefore
firms have constant returns to scale (both in the sense of stochastic and
in the usual sense for each state). >_.et ~ . * r be the probability that
j-th firm finds itself in state s,t S. in period I. Hence in period 1,
exactly it. portion of i-th firm is in the state s.. By definition Z tt = 1
J s -,-
,"' J s.e S. s
.
-'
-*
J j J
Let x. = A./.E, e , the debt-eauity ratio i-th firm chooses.
3 j i=l ii
' J
Since we assume that all firms and consumers of the same type behave in the
same manner, the ratio x. is common for all j-th type firms. Given the
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choice of x. and the price of loan for i--th type firm, p., the total
J 3
dividend payment by j-th firm in state s
-r S^ is
J
m m
Max|a. ( £ e..+p.O-&., 0] = Max] (a, (1 + p.x.) - x. } I e. , 0] .
' ^ . , xj ; j 3 is '3 J 1 . , 13
J 1-1 ] 1~A
Since dividend is distributed proportionally to the amount of investment,
the return for a unit of investment if state s. occurs, p. , is
3 33.
3
p. (x., p.) = Max[a. (1 + p.x.) - x. , 0]
.
[1}
JS 3 3 3 s , 3 3 3
3 j
Given the price p., firm will choose the optimal return profile by choosing
a suitable debt-equity ratio x. ,' R . We shall come back to this point later.
3 +
For the sake of simplicity;, we assume that consigners will face no
uncertainty except risks involved in returns from investment in firms. Let
w. =(w. , w.,)6 R. be the pair of endowments for each period for a consumer of
l lQ ll +
type i. In period 1, consumer's income in E. depends upon what state has
been realized in each firm in E . We call an array of individual states
n
a H (s.). - X S . = S as a social state of E, . A consumer's plan is a
plan of consumptions c. = ( c «, ( c. ) . j - R , i.e., consumption plan
for period and contingent plans for each social state, investments
e. = (e. .) . . . R, and purchase of bank deposit a. r R . A unit of bank
L 13 3=1 + 1 +
deposit is a contract such that a bank will deliver one unit of good in
period 1 regardless of the social state in exchange for investment in bank
in period 0. We vrrite d, {- R for the price for deposit in peirod in
terras of good in period 0. l/p„ - 1 is the interest rate for deposit.
Under prices p = [n
,
(p.)") R^ and firms decisions x = (>:.)" cRj,
a consumer's plan (c
.
, e., m.) is budget f easible if it satisfies

.'.
c
~
< w
-~
"* S e
.
- p^,m. (2)
iO = iO . - ij *0 i
c < w
,
, + T. p . ( •:.
, p . ) e . . + m
.
ia == il . js . i -j i
3=1 j -
for all a = (s.)
n
..
S .
.
(3)
2 j-X
Each consumer of type i is endowed with the same utility function,
S + 1
u = R -* R. Consumer's nlan (c. e., m.) is optimal if it is budgetit- ail
feasible and if there is no other budget feasible plan which would yield
higher utility.
Number of banks is arbitrary. However, for the convenience, we
treat this sector as though it consists of one bank in the whole economy.
This treatment is justified, for competitive banking implies constant returns
to scale for banks as will be shown in the following. Let mr £ r i>e £he units
of deposit banks offer to consumers in each subeconomy, E, . Let & ijR, be the
k Oj +
units of loan they finance to each of j-th type firm. Since we are interested
in some kind of equilibrium, we assume, cheat banks have correct expectations
about firms' return. Otherwise, banks will have profit or loss which would re-
sult in new entry or exit. Letf. be the expected return for banks from a
j
unit loan to a firm of type j. If j-th firm chooses the debt-equity ratio
x. and banks lend %n , units of loan to the firm, total investment of j-th
1 Oj
firm must be o.L. + £_./x., provided x. > 0. In period 1, banks expect
3 O3 0] j' j
to receive average return from each of j-th type firms of the amount,
s \ s j-s^Oj'
3
is.
(V0j +W ] -
j " "j
If x. = 0, firm of type -j will never go bankrupt, for a. > for all s. £S.
j
y * J 38j - J J

Hence expected return should be I , although firm would never
demand loans.
Oj
Therefore.
minfl, a. (p. + l/x.)j if x >
Ify P) ) - J
1 if x = ( 4.)
Banks' Plan is a pair (« , 1Q) = [*Q , UQ • )*J t £
+1
.
tenkS> plan iS
feasible if they can meet the amount of loan by the amount of deposit,
We consider two different types of banks.
(A. 2) Banks are perfectly competitive and
(A. 2)' Banks are regulated so that they cannot make any positive
profit (namely, banks must choose a feasible plan which would yield zero
profit.)
under competitive assumption (A. 2), banks' plan is optimal if,
given prices p, it is feasible and it maximizes profit.
among all feasible plans.
Under regulatory as i . i Lon (A. 2)', banks' plan is optimal if,
given prices p, it is feasible and
n
2 f
.
(x
. , p . ) SLn . - mn
J Oj

3 • Equilibrium
Throughout this paper, we assume the following in additon to
(A . 1) and (A . 2) (or (A . 2) ' ) .
(A. 3) For all i, u. is st v quasi-concave, differentiable
i
and monotone in consumption in peirod i.
{A. 4) w > and w._ > for all i.
Id XL
(A. 5) > for a] , ad all s. £ 5. .]S. 1 J
" J
Assumt that, by whatever reason, each type of firm has chosen a
debt-equity ratio, x., and x = (x.) is temporarily fixed. Then the
return from investment, p. , and return from loan, f . , depend only upon
prices. Under assumptions (A.l), (A. 2), (A. 3) - (A. 5), we can prove:
Proposition 1 For each >:£ R,, there exists prices p € R. ,i—,
-,. +
consumer's nlan (c
. , e,, m.)'"
,
, ' plan (£_, m ') such that
x x x :
(a) (c, e., in.) i iptima] under p for all i
(b) (£_, m ) is optimal under p
u o
m
(c) I ID
.
, X ~ u1=1
m
(d) I, , < x £ e. for ail j.
~ J L=l
XJ
Proof See Appendix .
te that the seme proposition holds under (A.l), (A. 2)', (A. 3) -
(A.5), for banks technology is that of constant returns to scale given the
prices. We call a paxr (x, P)6rJ x r£+1 , a pseudo-equilibrium of the economy
if p with (c
± ,
e
±
, b^J.j and (AQl mQ ) satisfies (a) - (d) under x. In other
words, if (x, p) is a pseudo-equilibrium, then p is a true equilibrium price
when firms choose x as their decisions under p.
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One may note that if (x, p) is a pseudo-equilibrium of the economy,
P
i
i Pq for a11 J- Namely, interest an is always higher than interest
on money. It is so because under the condition of zero profit (recall that
banking technology is that of constant returns to scale) , bank must charge
higher interest on loan in order to ansate a possibility of bankruptcy.
In what way co firms :.... their decisions? Since incomplete markets
and a possibility of bankruptcy are our major concern, neither profit
maximization nor value maximization can be an accepted doctrine. Therefore,
we will take a rather naive approach that firm's action is determined by
stockholders (investors). Since there are an infinite number of firms and
consumers, prices, p, must be viewed as given by them. Under a pseudo-equilibri
t
(x, p), a consumer prefers a decision x. to x. for a firm of type j if the
optimal plan under (x, p) yields higher utility to him than the optimal plan
I 1 !
under (x(x.), p) where x(x.) = (x,,...,x. , x., x , ..., x ). Similarly,
2 3 i j~ j- 3 J+1 n
a consumer prefers x. to x. under (x, p) if the optimal plan under [x(x ), pj
is preferred to the optimal plan under (x, p)
.
Under assumptions (A.l), (A. 2)', (A. 3) - (A, 5);
Proposit ion 2 There exists a pseudo-equilibrium (x, p) where no
consumer prefers any other debt equity ratio to x, for any firm j.
The pseado-eq, in .Proposition 2 is very stable, for there is
no consumer who wants to defect from the situation. However surprising, the
proposition is racher trivial.
Let x. - fi . . j. Whatever the prices are, p. > for all j
1 is.
and s. by (A.. rice of deposit pn (which is large and
correspcnoiii.t, interest rat -) such that there is no demand for
deposit by corifumers. On the other hand, sales of loan by firms are zero,
for x. = for all j. Tl ore, if m- = and Z„ . -- for all i, (ii_, nO
3
J Oj
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is optimal for any p. and clears both I money markets
under (A. 2)*.
Hence we can ignore bankii 1 ' ,0!
; :: and loan
"
Then
'
whatever p 's are, consumer's pla > deternined and they will clear
the markets. In particular, if ] firm's returns p (•, p)
1
is maximized . .-Of. ' " and ' r ' osition holds.
J
The que i of the ex . of a :rue equilibrium, both in the
sense of non-trivial one under regulata - imption (A.2) ! apAl in the sense.
of one under competitive assumption (A. 2), will not be pursued here. One
of the reasons is that cur bankruptcy rule wi 11 inevitably introduce non-
convexity and we can only hope some approxima:e equilibrium or local equili-
brium. A simple example in the next section .s an example where we cannot
have a true equilibrium but only a . : one. However, our main concern
being that of efficiency, we are ntenl with an economy which possesses only
a local equilibrium.

•4- J.
4 . Efficiency
Since we are con ! wil te markets, there is no great
hope that we c to Pareto efficiei Lbrium, Therefore, we con-
sider much weaker not . tmond [1]. A
pseudo-equilibrium of the economy (x, railed const. rained efficient
if there is no other pseudo-equi . '
,
p
' ) , which will make at least
one consumer better off without taal body worse off
Proposition 3 There may exist a constrained efficient pseudo-
equilibrium, (p, x) , and x' such that for all x.c (x ,x!) all the investors
prefer x. to x'.
.
J J
In other words, we may find a constrained efficient pseudo-equilibrium
so that not only all the investors want to change the debt-equity ratio even
locally but also they agree on the direction. Such a pseudo-equilibrium can ne-
ver be stable, and any equilibrium which reflects stockholders preference may
be inefficient- Different from the result on stockmarkets with value maxi-
mization (Stiglitz [7], Ekei i Wilson [2], Radner [6]), our inefficiency is
the result of the existence of bankruptcy and limited liability.
The proposit Lon tl ire Ls | ence of the following example.
Let n = 1 arid let us drop sul e, p denotes the price of
loan.) Let: S. = S - : J, 2} and a > a'
2
> 0. Let w^, > and w
±±
= for
all i. Assume that utility '• are identical for all i and are
nomothetic si difference curves. Finally assume
that u 's depi nly upon consumption in period 1. Namely,
i
u. = CcQ ,
. c
2
) t.( , . cv
'
i c and Cq .
:tat Lite econoi so that amount of loan
demand by firms is £(x). i . . ') and : Einitioi oJ equilibrium,
m m ra
(1 : px) - Z e + p£(x) - I. e -: pQ Z m. -
T. v
±Q
i=l " i=l i=l i=l

Therefore, for S = 1, 2,
r.i 2 m
= Max[a , ), 0] + E if min[a Z w. rt> i (x)
. , is s . . iG _ . s s . , iCr1=1 1=1 3=1 1=]
Hence the following hoi
Case 1 :
-
3
2
Z W
i0
C a
]
'
i=l
in a
c = a
. , n l . -,i=i i=l
ra m
i=l l2
Z
-
Case 2:
n r.i
2 . . 10
U -'
1 ~ 101=1 1 =
I
m ra m
* C
il
=
^1
.\ Vi0 - J2IUX) - a 2 : \ V/ 10 ]i=l i=l
ra m
Z c = Hx) - - w J.
1=1 1=1
Cas e 3
:
ra tn
a
2
.
E
,
v
ic "
a
j .-%
w
io =
,(x)
1=1 1=1
mm m
* C il
=
*
C
i2 ' 'i0i=l i=l
Therefore, ceper- mount of loan to a firm, £(x),
the economy (E )'s aggregi: segment AB in Figure 1.
ni m
AB has a slope -it /- [f , c = it a. X w + Tf„a E w n .
1 . , lO 2 2. .. lOi=l
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we obu . x, p) and .t - ted amount of loan £(x) i
that the ag gal < " ' . ,, is on an open
segment AB (i.e h p art shown
indirectlv in the Figur> . Le be the aj • c curve
through C. Then C beini th< a ; optimal cons imption, the aggregate
bua>. c t Line must be I . 1.1 to > . depicti as DE It; Figure 1.
Since E represents - gate consum] oners as a whole
would expect to obt ting all their end u nts in firms (note
ir
that p„(x, p) = lis case), (x k , 0) . Similarly, D
2
-
|
3.0
represents th<
| (
- onsumption plan whei the'; vest all their
ir. m
endowments in "bank deposit, D = ( £ w. a/pn , L w. r /p_). In Figure 1, E
i
-
lien in the 033;; of 3. and p.,(x, p) > a.
(
or a p - 1 > 0. ThereJ re,
investors unanimously prefer higher debt-equity 1 ' Li which woi Id increase
return for investor ir. • ! p . If E lies west of 3, the same
argument shows that investors un; -er debt-equity ratio.
Only at point F in Figure 2, investors are locally satisfied with the situation,
i.e., investors prefer to stay wi h« i = ; -equity raxio if their
alternatives are restricted to small changes only. En other words, in
the open segment AB, F is the only possibli
,. q lilibrium. Of course,
F cannot be an efficient 1 tate in our sense, for point G in Figure 2 makes
the all consumers better off. On the ether hand, at efficient state G, investors
unanimously prefer a higher debt-equity ratio. Finally, a point F cannot
be a true global rium, - . ice at F, p n (x, p) - a. and f , (x, p) = which
is preferred to by x = which would guarantee, p. = a and p = a .
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5 . Conclusions
In our economy , the rule of .limited liability (equation (1)) severs
the process of information transmission by prices. Because of the rule,
it is irrelevant for stockholder's preference how much output a. firm will
produce in a state where the fir;!: goes bankrupt, however, this .level of
output is at least as important as the level of i non-bankrupt states
from banks viewp< d therefore crucial for prices. In other words, the
marginal rate of product transformation between two states (a state where a
firm goes bankrupt and a state where bank does not go bankrupt) would be
equal to the raarginal rate of substitution when investor's consider the change
of output in bankruptcy state when the firm ehsng-s its action. Namely , when
the rate of return from a firm could be written as
p. (x. , p.) = a. (1 + p.x.) - x.,
JSj 3 1 is. 22 3
as a simple computation would show, MRS and MRPT would eoincic".:
However, with this modified rate of return, the rule of limited
liability would no longer exist and banks would be unable to pool risks.
In this sense, although one cannot hope that price 7r.echanism is likely to
lead to an efficient equilibrium in an economy with limited liability and
financial intermediaries, it is an inevitable price one must pay in order to
introduce the mechanism of financial intermediation.

m
A Figure 1
ci
[Vl + V2 ] .% WiO1=1
m
2. , 10i=l
Figure 2
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Appendix 1
n
,We shall prove Proposi herefc : i fixed through-
out this section. Let q.(p., p-J = |
Lemnra 1 q . (
• ,
p.) has a unique fixed point for oil p c R,.
Proof q.(*, Pp.") is continuous and non-decreasing for each p„ R , for f (x , p )j U +•.3 j j
has the same property. The range of q.(«, p..) is contained in a compact set,
[0, pj. Unless p = 0, p. = cannot be a fixed point. Hence, if q.(*, p„)
is concave for given p..'':R
,
there is a unique fixed point:. To see this,
observe that min[l, a^ (p. + 1/x ) ] is concave in p,
3 s .• J 3 3
of concave functions is also concave and hence q . (p ) is concave
1 J
f
.
(x.
, p .) as a sum
J 1 j
O.E.D.
Because of the above lemma, <j>.(p,J = ip ' q.(p , d„) = p } is
J J J j
r
j
a well-defined, single-valued function.
Lemma 2 9
. (tO is continuous.
j
Proof It follows from the continuity of q.(p.,' •) for each p and the concavity of
q .(', 0)
.
Q.E.D.
S+l r
Let B. : R. •-> R, x R, x R, such tih
i + + + +
> ) = (c.,e.,i.)XL' j. 1 _j_ (c., e., m. ) satisfies (2) and (3)
with p = *.(PQ )
and
(c, •:, » (~ B
i (p )
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Lemma 3 S.C?-,) is a contimsous function for all p_ > 0.
Proof 5.(p ) is a well-defined function 11 p~ > , for B~(pn ) is non-
empty, compact valued fc p > 0. Cor, - follows from the continuity
of u; and B (p ) , Continuity of B (p.) is guaran
1
y A. 4 ;>y usual reasons.
"-
•_'.::
m
Let iKp
q ) (P
*,
,(P ) } ' , ° li !^ c :;» e i' mi);?i (p )}
J -*- .LA
and I, = [7-, kj for each k = 2, 3, ..
Define a mapping Yi : It "*" li. such tK K. !'•
Yk (P ) = min[k, :uax(-, pQ + tjKpQ ) 1
Since ,^(p) is a. continuous single-valued function,
Y, (p.) is continuous and using Brewer's fixe 3 point, theorem,
ft
Lemma 4 For each k = 2, 3, ..., there exists a fixed point, pQ,such that
* A
P0k
= V P0k } •
Proof of Prooosii
.
Consider a sequence lp
nk k .-,. Let us show that < lim inf pQ <.
k -** TO
* 1
Lim cup p < ». Firsc, let e > be small c- tough so ; ; t a. (1 + p~x.) - x. <—
for all pf in an open interval, (0. c) . Since 4> . (p.) < p. for all p „ , for any
3A i(0, e), (p.), x.) <— for all 3 a.aH 3.. For such p € (Q , e) , there-u 3^^J u JPq J u
fore, m, > 1) and e., = for all i and j whenever (c., e
.
, m.)<f £.(p A ). Ini 11 x x x u
/iew of the definition of y, , Pn £ (0, e) cannot be a fixed point for Yr (Pq)
*
for any k. Hence lin irf p„, > e > 0.
.
" 0k =
k -* °°
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Next, let N > Da large enough so that a. (p r + 1/x ) > 1 + 1/x N
J s . (J -j i
for all j and s. wnen p > N. Then, for p^ > K, p -; p is a fixed point of
<!.(*, Pn ) for all j an oint must be unique, ^..(p r ) = p
for all j. But then, p. (x., (f>.(p ))> 1/N = l/pQ for all j and s. for p. > N.
n
JS
j J -
1
-1
Namely, .E.. e. . > and m, = whenever (c. , e . , m.)£ £,.<p~) for all i.j=l ij i i i i
.
i '
But because of definition, such pr > K cannot be a fixed point for y . Htjnce,
lim sup p , =< N < °°. Therefore, there is a subsequence of i.pn ; „ which
converges to p " [e, K,].
Let (c., e., in.) 1.^. (:.i,,) for all i. Then o. . Z_ m. - ,Z, *.(pn ) .2-, x.e..1' x 11 .' i=l 1 i = l i x=l j 11
*
U1 A * m * * *
must hold. Let m = .£ m £ = .1 x.e... and p. = <S.(p») for all i andOi i=l x Oj x=l j i] 3 T j r
ft * n * * * tn * * nj. Then (p0> (p ) ) , ( c± , ei , \) iml » (n^ , (V.)., 3) satisfies (a) - (d)
of the proposition.
Q.S.D.
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